

APPROXIMATE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

3 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt. Jonathan T. Howe, USN  
Office of the Vice President


SUBJECT : Invitation to Mr. Rockefeller to  
Serve as Chairman of National  
Intelligence Museum Advisory Board

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum of January 20, 1977,  
Subject as Above

1. With regard to Mr. Cramer's request that Mr. Rockefeller become Chairman of the Advisory Board of a National Intelligence Museum proposed by Mr. Cramer, this Agency has not taken a formal position on the merits of Mr. Cramer's proposal for a Museum.

2. On January 10, 1977, Mr. Cramer wrote Director Bush asking that he serve as a member of the Advisory Board. Mr. Bush acknowledged but did not agree at this time to participate.

3. Thank you for your inquiry. I would be pleased to discuss it with you further by phone if you need further information.



Deputy Assistant to the  
Director of Central Intelligence

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DA/DCI [Redacted]  
Distribution: Orig-Addressed  
1-Chrono  
1-CM  
1-Dave  
Peterson



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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

I agree wholeheartedly that the Agency is not in a position to endorse or not endorse or comment on the proposal.

Perhaps the former v.p. might wish to address it as he would a major charitable contribution, i.e. inquiry, examination of all documents, actual discussion with named personalities, before making a commitment.

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


OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR:




Deputy Chief  
Current Reporting Group  
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT:

Invitation to Vice President to Serve  
as Chairman of National Intelligence  
Museum Advisory Board

Dave, does the Agency have any information or comment  
on this proposal?

  
Jonathan T. Howe  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

Attachment.

National Intelligence Museum  
P.O. Box 34682  
Washington, D.C. 20034

12 January 1977

The Honorable Nelson Rockefeller  
Vice President of the United States  
Executive Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Vice President:

This letter is to seek your agreement to support an effort to establish a National Intelligence Museum, after you leave the Vice Presidency later this month, by becoming Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Museum.

As members of a recently-formed Committee for establishment of the Museum, we have been asked by the Committee to see if you will agree to serve, on your retirement from National office. After we have a response from you, we hope to ask President Ford if he will agree to serve as Honorary Chairman. We plan, also, to approach a number of other National leaders to see if they will serve on the Advisory Board. These include Governor Connally, Senator Buckley, Secretary Simon, Governor Reagan, Ambassador Bruce, Ambassador Black, Senator Brock, Ambassador Rush, Mr. Warner, Ambassador McGhee, Ambassador Luce, Mr. Cherne, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Laird, Mr. William Casey, Mr. Ball, Mr. Warnke, Ambassador Irwin, Mr. Ruckelshaus, Secretary Richardson, Mr. Packard, Mr. Clement, Senator Taft, and former Directors of Central Intelligence, Ambassador Bush, Mr. McCone and Mr. Colby.

After our Advisory Board membership is partly filled, we plan to ask some Representatives and Senators to also serve (e.g. Senator Mathias and Senator Nunn; former Representative Morgan), but we do not plan to ask any incumbent officers of the Executive Branch to serve.

So that you might have an idea of our thinking on the proposed Museum and Center, we have enclosed for your review a draft fund-raising letter on the Museum and a note on the functions proposed for the Center.

The Honorable Nelson Rockefeller  
12 January 1977  
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We would add a few further practical observations on our project for your consideration. First, the Museum's projected location in downtown Washington, where the tourists are, enables us to keep the development costs down sharply, compared to the cost of a new, specially-built building.

Secondly, we hope the Museum will be largely self-sustaining by the third year from ticket and book sales, so that large contributors will not be expected to continue to give large amounts to the Museum for many years running. In fact, it is our hope that within a very few years the Museum will be taking in enough to maintain itself, update and refurbish exhibits, and subsidize both the activities of the Center, and eventually other non-profit organizations serving the overall public educational purposes of the Museum and the Center.

Finally, should you have questions on the project, we would be pleased to answer them in person or to provide further written information.

We are very grateful for your consideration of this request, and hope you will agree to serve.

Yours respectfully,

  
J. Milnor Roberts  
Major General, USAR

Martin G. Cramer

For the Committee for a  
National Intelligence Museum

JMR/gw  
Encl.

National Intelligence Museum

As you know, our intelligence agencies have been under intense criticism, some warranted, much unwarranted, often with a destructive result. Charged with providing our President and other top civilian and military leaders with the best information which can be assembled through human ingenuity and modern technology, these organizations depend on continuing understanding of their role by the American people and their representatives. This understanding depends in turn on knowledge of the past, current and future place of intelligence in the making of national defense decisions and the conduct of our international affairs.

It has been apparent for quite a while that the American people do not comprehend the <sup>importance</sup> of intelligence to a modern nation, or the historical importance of intelligence to the creation of the United States as an independent country and a world leader. The effectiveness of our intelligence activities has been impaired by this lack of appreciation of the essential nature of democratically-controlled intelligence. Many Americans do not appear to recognize the universality of intelligence operations throughout history and among all modern nations. Somehow the idea has become widespread that intelligence collection and analysis are useless, harmful, and "un-American".

Too little known among our people today is the fact that intelligence, including espionage, goes back to Ancient China and Biblical times. Long buried and forgotten are the roles in intelligence of George Washington, Ben Franklin, other Founding Fathers and unsung heroes during America's War of Independence, not to mention the roles of long-secret French and Spanish allies. Some of this history--and part of what will be described in one section of the historical part of the museum--is recounted in the brochure which I am enclosing for your review.

Similar demonstrations of the importance of intelligence in the history of the United States, and of the struggle of free countries against dictatorships, can be found in both World Wars, in the interwar period and throughout the post-war period.

What more dramatic illustrations of the need for the best possible information and for good use of this intelligence, could be provided than Pearl Harbor; the postwar struggle for Europe and confrontations between the U.S. and the Soviets over Germany; the Korean War, including the intervention of Chinese troops; the Bay of Pigs; the Cuba Missile Crisis; the many recent wars in the Near East; and the long wars in Southeast Asia? The list of examples of the need for the best possible intelligence could be longer; and the current world scene extends it further with the overriding and continuing need for both deterrence of the country's major potential adversary and for efforts to achieve arms limitations and control.

The need is underscored as the other weapons superpower raises its military capabilities and further spreads its influence in the Third World and elsewhere; and as the current and future world scenes feature the spread of nuclear weapons production; terrorist activities; and the threat and reality of local conflicts and wars.

Meanwhile, the old "requirements" continue...understanding the strength of other countries; preparing for the unwanted contingency of possible wars; understanding what changes in government--predicted, unpredicted, legal and illegal, gradual and sudden--around the world mean for U.S. objectives and interests; assisting in the massive budgetary decisions relating to choices of weapons systems.

In short, the nation needs a strong intelligence capability, now and in the future, backed by widespread public understanding and support. Further, as has been

pointed out by former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird; General Daniel Graham, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and the National Executive Committee of the American Legion, if we continue to hobble our intelligence organizations, the KGB and its allied organizations will not be hobbled by their national leaders, or obligingly hobble themselves.

In the short-run, and in some ways, things have been getting better. The flurry of wholesale disclosures of the identities of American intelligence officers, which appears to have led to one death, the threat of many more, and the weakening of the trust of allies and intelligence links with them, has subsided. A number of outstanding former intelligence officers have written and spoken widely on intelligence needs and activities. Colleges and schools are beginning to pay at least some attention to how intelligence activities support the making of major decisions such as the choice of weapons systems.

But the educational need is a long-term and continuing one, not short-term and transitory. The books now coming out by leading former administrators and analysts will help. But they will reach only a relatively few people. Other means, which, over time, reach millions of people are required. One of the best--and often most underestimated--instruments for such education is the museum. No one who has visited the Smithsonian or the Toronto or Chicago or Philadelphia museums of science and natural history, or read statistics on museum attendance from art galleries and archives to wax museums, underestimates this means of education and understanding. Not in this TV age of visual impression and instant attitude formation!

The museum will not be a wax museum, but will rely heavily on artifacts, photography, art work and other audio visual creations. In addition to the historical treatments



referred to earlier in this letter and in the enclosed brochure, other historical coverage of such matters as Queen Elizabeth's espionage network; the American Civil War; the espionage and related efforts of Imperial and Nazi Germany, Militarist Japan, and Soviet Russia in the two world wars; the feats of British intelligence in World War II; successes and mistakes in battlefield intelligence of the U.S. in the Second World War; and the postwar developments already mentioned in this letter.

In its treatment of technology the museum will contain items from the SAMOS "spy in the sky", the U-2, and the Pueblo to secret inks and concealment devices.

In its treatment of people the museum has thousands of true stories to pick from, from Biblical and medieval era spies to "Cicero" and Moe Berg, and including the unsung heroes described in the brochure which you have received with this appeal, and many unsung heroes and villains who have followed them. Not least of all, the gallery of people will include Presidents and Secretaries of State or Defense and other national leaders, too, who have had an impact on the national intelligence history, from General Washington through Army "alumni" Presidents--General Eisenhower and "Capt. Harry" Truman, to the recent Presidents who were Navy "alumni"--Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter.

Everything used in the museum, this colorful instrument for education, will, of course, be in the public domain. The museum will not--being a museum, not a newspaper or book--be a vehicle for controversy and debate over current issues, such as the nature and desirability of an Espionage Act or the form future Congressional oversight of intelligence activities should take. But an American public aware of the place of intelligence in the life (and, on occasion, threatened death) of the world's most complicated democracy,

will be better equipped to consider such serious matters.

While entertaining and educating millions of Americans who will visit Washington in years to come, the National Intelligence Museum will make a number of general points about intelligence which need badly to be better learned by the leaders and people of America. These include:

- Intelligence operations represent a virtually universal activity worldwide.
- But intelligence collection--especially through espionage--is also one of the most "national" activities, varying greatly between free and totalitarian countries both with regard to how they are conducted and how they are viewed.
- Espionage is one of the oldest activities of peoples, long before there were nations in the modern sense.
- Although Americans have long thought of intelligence and related operations as somehow un-American, American national interests have been influenced by them from Revolutionary times and through hot and cold wars ever since the Republic was founded.
- Major national decisions depend on good information, including intelligence. But having good information does not always mean it will be used in a timely fashion--or lead to wise decisions.
- As the world has become technology-centered, so has the arena of intelligence and espionage--in the air and space and the oceans, as well as on land. But it has always had its technical side, from the first secret writing onward.

The major advantage of exhibitry as an educational tool lies in the fact that it is, in general, a layman's medium and a simplifying device. It is just this layman's explanation of intelligence which has been lacking in American education and communication.

I have long been interested in the idea of a national intelligence museum, and have been pleased that the concept for one has been developed by Martin Cramer, a Foreign Service Officer who served in both military and civilian intelligence roles.

I have the privilege of serving as the Chairman of a trail-blazing Committee for a National Intelligence Museum, which will, I hope, enlist many persons very well known to you. Even at this early stage in the effort, we have enlisted the support for the concept from former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, former Undersecretary of State William Casey, former CIA Director William Colby, and others who have played important roles in the forging of the nation's defense and international affairs in peace and war.

This nation has gone too long without an institution which educates and informs our people on the men, women and ideas in intelligence who have served our country so well, from General Washington's Major Benjamin Tallmadge and Robert Townsend to the men and women who have served Presidents as recent as Ford and Carter. The country has a number of museums which display pieces of the military part of the picture, but it needs one to portray much more of the intelligence story. Even the fabulous story of World War II intelligence, including the OSS chapter, is neglected in all the media; although several small countries celebrate their resistance to tyranny in national museums.

My associates on the Committee and I believe that the best way for the United States to have a long-overdue national intelligence museum is through private action and private funding. Before we can go to the nation with a broader appeal, we must raise at least \$180,000. This is twenty percent of the \$900,000 which we estimate will be required to establish a non-profit, admission-charging National (Historical) Intelligence Museum in an old refur-

are, therefore, making this appeal to persons known to be dedicated to patriotic causes and able to make generous contributions to the development fund for the Museum. We have, of course, filed for tax-exempt status with the Internal Revenue Service and have had a preliminary indication that we will be accorded that status, and you will be notified when this retroactive approval is granted.

The larger the contributions received in response to this limited appeal, the better start we will have in broadening our fundraising campaign. Checks should be made out to National Intelligence Museum, and addressed to Roger Abbot, Secretary Treasurer, P.O. Box 34682, Washington, D.C. 20034.

We appreciate your help in this important national educational undertaking in support of the security and well-being of our nation.

Sincerely,